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Abstract - Economists have often analysed the impact that the spread of beliefs and behaviors have on the 
equilibrium and performance of markets. Recent experimental studies on peer pressure in groups of agents 
interacting in investment and gift exchange games (Mittone and Ploner, 2011, Gachter et al. 2010) have proved 
that the imitation of partners’ behaviors can have substantial effects on reciprocity,  thus confirming that the 
effects of information also need to be studied in games where social preferences play a fundamental role. The 
aim of this paper is to ascertain whether trust is affected by contagion and herding in small groups of trustors 
who can observe each other’s choices over time. We account for three important factors of trustors’ preferences, 
namely: risk attitude, generosity and expected trustworthiness. Using our data we test the basic hypothesis that 
an individual's propensity to trust recipients in the Trust Game can be affected by the observed behavior of other 
trustors. Our results confirm that trust is affected by contagion effects. Furthermore, we find that specific types 
of agents (generous or untrusting) more often imitate the same type, when positioned in the same group. Finally, 
we find that untrusting individuals are less affected by their peers compared to generous individuals, and they 
imitate less even when positioned in groups of agents who have the same characteristics.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists have often analysed the impact that the spread of beliefs and behaviors 
have on the equilibrium and performance of markets. However, there are many real-
world situations in which we observe a similar phenomenon of imitation and social 
contagion. The reasons why a specific restaurant suddenly becomes fashionable and 
trendy although it serves perfectly ordinary food and its prices are outrageous are 
sometimes beyond our understanding. The generality of the phenomenon clarifies the fact 
that people who live in the same social or economic environment tend to be influenced by 
the choices of their peers, even when there is no direct connection  between the economic 
interests or the tastes of the agents and the group is randomly formed.   
Confining our analysis to the economic literature, there are several examples of the 
diffusion of behaviors and beliefs in the financial market literature as well as in 
innovation and consumption analyses and in studies of market competition. This 
phenomenon is of great importance and many empirical and experimental research 
investigations have tried to describe its nature and consequences.  Recently, a number of 
experimental papers have focused on imitation and contagion in economic environments 
which had not previously received any particular attention. To cite some examples,  Falk 
and Ichino (2003) find clear signs of peer pressure between workers engaged in the same 
task. Mittone and Ploner (2011) find evidence of  peer influence and convergence of 
behavior  among trustees in an Investment Game. Gachter, Nosenzo and Sefton (2010) 
find that information on the reciprocal behavior of peers affects the individual’s level of 
reciprocity in a Gift Exchange Game. Finally, Falk, Fischbaker and Gachter (2009) find 
that individuals adapt their behavior to the group to which they are randomly allocated in 
Coordination and Public Good Games. The interesting point made by these  studies is not 
only that price or consumption strategies might be imitated but also that reciprocity, trust,   2
cooperation and work efforts are affected by “convergence or dispersion of behavior”  in 
social networks and groups of individuals.  
Experimentalists and theorists have been interested in two different aspects of the 
problem. First, it is interesting to assess whether contagion exists and, second, it is 
important to assess what consequences the influence of peers brings to the economic 
model to be tested.  
For example, Falk and Ichino, 2003, prove that workers are conditioned by the 
observed productivity level of workers engaged in the same task, even when there are no 
benefit externalities between the productivity of the two agents. The social effect of the 
contagion here is to increase the overall level of productivity, compared to the same level 
measured in single workers' production processes. 
  In Mittone and Ploner (2011), the experimental design aims to assess whether 
reciprocal behavior is imitated in a Trust Game. In their paper, four recipients are 
connected to the same trustor in a one-shot Investment Game and in one treatment 
recipients can observe the choices of the other agents. The results show that the 
individual level of reciprocity tends to decrease as a result of peer pressure.  
The observation of peer behavior is also important in determining the selection of an 
equilibrium in coordination and public good games, as in Falk, Fischbaker and Gachter 
(2009), where the same individual is allocated to two different neighborhoods and his 
actions are affected by the choices of the two groups’ components. The main results of 
the paper can be summarized as follows. First, observation of the choices of agents 
operating in the same group strongly affects the individuals' behavior. Second, after 
studying the individuals' propensity to be affected by the behavior of peers, it can be 
stated that subjects exhibit a more pronounced propensity in the high material incentives 
context (Minimum Effort Game), and a less pronounced propensity in the moderate 
material incentives context (Public Good Game).  
On the other hand, in the public goods game, there is a substantial heterogeneity with 
relation to individual inclination to display social interaction effects: some subjects are 
more affected by their neighbors while others are less affected. In general, they enucleate   3
two classes of subjects: those whose behaviour is influenced by the behaviour of their co-
players and those whose behaviour is independent of the choices of others.
1 
 
Finally, the effect of peer pressure on reciprocity is studied in Gachter, Nosenzo and 
Sefton (2010) where Gift Exchange Games are experimented; the designs are constructed 
in such a way that two employees choose their work efforts sequentially and the second 
employee can observe the choice of his/her predecessor. The results show that, overall, 
the observation of the peer’s choices has a detrimental impact on reciprocity, but there is 
also a different attitude to the social influence, in the sense that the second player is more 
affected by the difference in efforts and less affected by the  difference in salaries. 
 
The present paper is motivated by two basic research questions. The first objective of 
our paper is to assess whether trust is affected by peer influence in groups of agents 
engaged in the repeated playing of different Investment Games (i.e., with uncorrelated 
recipients). Second, if  there is convergence of behavior over time, we would like to 
assess whether social influence produces an increase (or a decrease) in the overall level of 
trust. Analysis of the data set allows us, moreover, to study how the individual's 
preference for trust affects the individual's propensity to imitate others’ behavior. 
Specifically, our experimental design is based on the Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, 
and McCabe, 1995); the subjects who play in the role of Trustors can observe the 
behavior of two similar types of agents over fifteen periods of play. The experiments are 
divided into different parts, each of which takes into account different components that 
can explain the Trustors’ behavioral decisions, namely: (i) risk attitude, (ii) social 
preferences, (iii) socio demographic characteristics (iv) expected trustworthiness (see 
Ashraf et al., 2006). These components are then used both to correctly estimate the social 
influence hypothesis and to observe how subjects behave in different contexts.  
Our findings show that there is convergence in trusting behavior in almost all groups 
and the effect of imitation is (in the majority of the groups) to significantly reduce the 
number of tokens sent by Trustors in each period. Furthermore, by analyzing imitation 
within the groups, we find that agents tend to imitate similar types when positioned in the 
                                                 
1 For a similar result, see also Glaeser, et al. (1996) and section 4 of this paper.   4
same group.
2 Indeed, in the few groups in which there was a majority of generous and 
risk-loving subjects, trust substantially increased over time, since the generous imitated 
similar types. Finally, we find that the generous and risk-taking type (as opposed to the 
untrusting and risk averse types) have the highest propensity to be influenced by the 
behavior of other agents when positioned in a group, regardless of the characteristics of 
his/her peers.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a review of the 
Investment Game and the related studies on the effects that risk attitude, social 
preferences and beliefs of trustworthiness have on the individual propensity of  Trustors 
to send tokens to Recipients in the game. Section 3 presents our experimental design and 
the behavioral hypotheses, while Sections 4-5 describe the experimental and econometric 
methodologies we adopted to estimate the peer effects and our empirical findings. Section 
6 provides some conclusions.   
 
 
2. The Investment Game and Investors’ motivations and preferences 
    As noted in Fehr (2009), "Trust plays a role in almost all human relationships... Trust 
also seems particularly important in economic exchanges because it seems obvious that 
the absence of trust among the trading partners severely hampers market transactions..."  
    The basic question is however to pin down what the determinants of trusting behavior 
in market transactions are, since social motivations are here mixed with the standard 
profit motivations that are generally examined in all economic exchanges. 
    In Berg et al (1995) the authors find that social history matters in the sense that under 
particular conditions trust and reciprocity are stronger when individuals can observe the 
behaviour of previous peers. Indeed, in the absence of rewards and sanctions, endogenous 
social norms can emerge if individuals clearly identify with a group: social history, by 
providing common information on the use of trust within a previous group, may increase 
social identity. 
    Berg et al. experimentally find that individuals who participate in the “social history” 
treatment, and who receive a report summarizing the decisions of the previous 
                                                 
2 We often use the term “neighbourhood” to define our groups of three trustors, borrowing the expression 
by Falk et al (2009).    5
experimental subjects, behave differently from the individuals (belonging to the same 
college) who participate in the “no-history” treatment, without receiving any report. They 
find clear evidence of internalization of the social norm (as an effect of social history): 
the subjects who can observe previous peers behave differently from the ones that do not.  
          It remains largely open to debate which driving forces are behind the change in 
individual behaviour, both for the trustors and the trustees, and, in the case of 
heterogeneity across individuals, which individuals (e.g. in terms of risk attitude) are 
more influenced and which are less influenced by the observations of  previous peers’ 
choices. 
     The trustors’ motivations for sending a non-zero amount to trustees are the main  topic 
of Dufwenberg et al (2001), and Cox (2004). These papers provide a comparison between  
the amount sent in a Dictator Game and the amount sent in a Trust Game. The main result 
of these papers is that only small amounts of money sent by trustors are due to 
expectations of trustworthiness. This expectation is measured by the additional difference 
between what the trustors send in the Dictator and the Trust (Investment) Games. 
Because of the between-subjects design (the subjects who play the Investment game are 
not the same as those who play the Dictator game), their results cannot be checked for 
heterogeneity in social preferences.   
     The same topic – with a neat distinction between the two motivations for a non-zero 
investment by the trustors: 1) Reciprocity and 2) Unconditional kindness – is studied by 
Ashraf et al (2006).  
      According to the reciprocity motivation, the sender - trustor contributes (sends a 
positive number of tokens) on the expectation of trustworthiness: the main driver of this 
behaviour can be found in the «calculative trust»
3, meaning the return that the sender 
expects to have back from the receiver in the Trust  (investment) Game.  
      According to the unconditional kindness motivation, the sender - trustor contributes 
either on social preferences or on psychological benefits: the anticipation of a 
positive/negative reaction by the receiver (the expected number of tokens sent back by 
                                                 
3 The distinction between  “calculative trust”  and “personal (unconditional) trust” is in Williamson (1993). 
Rabin (1993) defines “kindness” as the common  regard for trust (between trustor and trustee) and 
incorporates a kindness function into subjects’ utility: the prime mover’s (trustor’s) investment becomes the 
generating force (or pre-disposition) for the disposition to reciprocate by the trustee.    6
the receiver) has no role in the sender’s behaviour: The basic driver of the sender’s 
preference must instead be located in the social and/or individual (psychological) 
preferences for giving, irrespective of the receiver’s future behaviour.  
      In Ashraf et al (2006) the subjects who play the Dictator game are the same as those 
who play the Investment game (the authors adopt a within-subjects design), a design that 
makes it possible to check for heterogeneity in demographic characteristics (the 
experiment refers to three countries Russia, South Africa, United States), trust attitude 
and risk preferences. In relation to trustors’ behaviour, the authors find that these 
variables (demographic characteristics, trust attitude and risk preferences) explain little of 
the variation observed. The main result is that expectation of returns plays a major role 
but unconditional kindness also matters. 
      A comparison between trust attitude and risk attitude, which include two behavioural 
risk measures and one survey measure of risk attitudes, is the main topic of the Ecket et al  
(2004) paper.  These authors find a weak relationship between risk attitude and decision 
to trust.
4 
            In the paper by Houser et al (2010) trust behaviour - which involves strategic 
uncertainty, is compared with risk behaviour, which  involves state uncertainty. In order 
to check for trustors’ pro-social impulses they run different treatments: In one risky 
treatment the trustors interact with a computer (instead of a human trustee), in order to 
exclude a “trust component”, In a second risky treatment the trustors interact with a 
human trustee, in order to include a “trust  component”. 
      They obtain two main results: 1) the aggregate investment distribution differs 
significantly in the trust environment compared to the risky environment; 2) risk attitudes 
predict individual investment in the risky game but not in the  corresponding trust game. 
These authors find no connection between risk attitudes and the decision to opt-out 
                                                 
4 The decision to trust a stranger is not equivalent to taking a risky bet (Bohnet et al  2004): in fact trust 
involves “strategic” uncertainty while risk involves “state” uncertainty. In the absence of social history - 
information on peers’ behaviour - experimental subjects require an additional risk premium to balance the 
costs of trust betrayal: senders-trustors state higher minimum acceptable probability (MAP) in the trust 
game than in the (risky) dictator game, where nature determines the outcome. The main focus of our paper 
is in studying risk behaviour under state uncertainty, thus avoiding any strategic motivation for the trustors. 
For this reason we do not consider betrayal attitudes. 
 
   7
(invest zero) but, conditional on investing a positive amount, they obtain clear evidence 
that risk attitudes predict decisions in risk treatments. 
    These results support the view that motives for trust are not connected in a simple way 
to risk attitudes, so the authors leave room for (even if they do not check for) emotional 
explanations, such as betrayal aversion. 
    The previous results open the door to a more complex explanation of the relationship 
between risk attitude and trust: different biological and economic foundations  (as in 
Fehr, 2009) can be investigated in order to explain how “strategic” uncertainty and 
“state” uncertainty act in modifying social preferences.  
     A variation in “strategic” uncertainty has been studied in Bauernschuster, Falk, Grosse 
(2010): in their experiment the introduction of competition between trustors reduces 
trustees’ reciprocation. 
          Another form of variation in strategic uncertainty (Cassar-Rigdon; 2010)  can be 
experimentally created by alternatively introducing competition between trustors and 
between trustees: by comparing the results under the two different treatments, the authors 
observe more trust under sender competition (and no receiver competition) compared to 
receiver competition (and no sender competition). The main conclusion that can be drawn 
is that trust is comparative and can be changed by manipulating strategic uncertainty via 
the modification of trustors’ (and/or trustees’) level of competition. 
        A variation in “state” uncertainty, can be experimentally obtained through the 
manipulation of information on peers as in Mittone-Ploner (2011):  access to information 
on choices of peers in the same groups reduces trustee’s reciprocation.  
    Our experimental paper focuses on the role played by the introduction of non-strategic 
information in modifying  trustors’ behaviour. In particular, by classifying different types 
of trustors both in term of risk attitude and social preferences, our paper is able provide a 
better understanding of the greater dispersion in trust data compared to risk data, as in 
Butler et al.  2010) 
 
 
3. The Experimental Design and the behavioral hypotheses 
   8
The experimental design was based on a standard Investment Game in which two 
agents acted sequentially. Player A was given an endowment of 600 experimental tokens 
at the beginning of each period and he had to decide how much of this endowment he 
kept for himself and how much he transferred to player B who received the amount sent 
by A multiplied by a factor: α = 3.
 5 Player B had therefore to decide how many tokens he 
would send back to Player A and the game ended.  
As in the basic model, the profit function for player A was in each period therefore :  
Bt At At y x G + − = π                                 (1) 
Where G is the per period endowment of 6 tokens, xAt  are the tokens sent to the 
Recipient and yBt are the tokens the Trustor receives back from the Recipient. 
While the profit made by player B corresponds to: 
Bt At Bt y x − =α π                  (2) 
Overall, the game lasted for twenty periods, but in each period the A players were 
matched with different B players. It is important to notice that - in all the sessions - 
subjects were re-matched with different recipients and they were aware that they would 
not meet the same partner again; furthermore all subjects were paid for only one period of 
play and the period was randomly selected at the end of the session.    
Another important feature of the experimental design was that, starting with the sixth 
period, each sender was positioned in a group of three senders and he/she was able to 
observe the choices of the other members of the group for the remaining fifteen periods 
of play.  
 
Overall, the experiments were composed of four different parts (including the Trust 
Game), which were randomly presented to the subjects.  
In part one, all participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire which contained three 
types of questions. First, questions were related to the subject's demographic and 
economic characteristics; second  (following Fehr, 2009) the subject was asked to define 
– on a scale 0-10 – his/her attitude to risk. Finally, as in the World Value Survey, we 
asked questions in order to measure trust at the individual level: 
                                                 
5 The experimental exchange rate was 1 token = 1 Euro cent.    9
"Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people or that one can 
never be too careful?".
6 
The individual risk attitude was also measured in a different part where participants had 
to indicate their choices in six lotteries (Eckel - Wilson, 2004, Holt - Laury, 2002). 
 
Finally, in the fourth part, participants played a one-shot dictator game, with A players 
in the role of the dictator. At the beginning of the session, participants were randomly 
divided into two groups (A and B players) and the Recipients played all parts of the 
experiment, however, they were not positioned in groups from the sixth to the twentieth 
periods.  
All subjects were paid at the end of the experiment. They received a show up fee and 
they were paid on the basis of their performance in the lottery and the dictator games, 
while, for the Investment game, they were paid only for one period chosen randomly at 
the end of the session. The sample is composed of 90 subjects (45 senders and 45 
recipients), the average payoff of the participants was around €19 and each session lasted 
for about one and a half hours. The experiments comprised four different sessions, one of 
which was run in 2009 at the University of Siena and three of which were run in May 
2010 at the University of Salerno.  
As in Ashraf et al. (2006), the experimental design presented here comprises different 
parts, each devoted to measuring specific aspects of the individual trusting behavior.  
Specifically, the decision of the Sender to send tokens to an anonymous recipient in a 
Trust Game (see Section 2) in a one-shot game, has been explained on the basis of two 
main motivations: the expectation of monetary returns (or expected trustworthiness) and  
the unconditional desire to be kind to another human being ("unconditional kindness", 
"warm glow", "altruism"). Both motivations are mixed every time a subject decides to 
send part of the endowment to an anonymous recipient.
7  
In the experimental literature, there are several papers which aim to separate the two 
aspects.  
                                                 
6 A copy of the questionnaire is available on request. 
7 In our experiment, as in the majority of (one-stage or repeated) Trust Game experiments, we observe that 
a  relevant proportion of subjects sends a part of the endowment to recipients in contrast with the standard 
equilibrium prediction.   10
 
Here, the main research question is to assess whether trust can be affected by contagion, 
while taking into account the unobserved individuals' attitude to trust in order to ensure a 
correct measurement. For this reason, in each section of the experimental design, we 
concentrate on measuring the individuals' preferences and adopt a within-subject design 
(Ashraf et al., 2006). 
First, expected trustworthiness is measured using the subjects' answer to the WVS 
survey question reported above. The experimental literature contains several 
methodologies that have been used to elicit the trustor's belief on the expected behavior 
of the recipient. Experimentalists have often adopted a direct measure of the expected 
trustworthiness by asking the subject to express his/her own expectation on the recipient's 
trustworthiness (see Ashraf et al., 2006; Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker, 2008)
 8 .  
In a recent paper, Sapienza et al., (2007), run a modified Trust Game in order to 
extrapolate the "belief component" from the trustor's actions which are also affected by 
his/her generosity and risk attitude. Their main finding is that "the sender's expectation of 
the receiver's trustworthiness is a good predictor of the quantity sent in the Trust game 
and it is highly correlated with the trust question in WVS" ( p. 3).
9 In our design, we 
adopted the answers to the WVS as a proxy of expected reciprocity for two reasons: first, 
we run the experiments in two Universities located in two economically and socially 
different Italian regions, thus  and our sample has a high degree of heterogeneity in the 
social and economic background (see footnote 9); second  we wanted to avoid the 
confusion that a direct elicitation may induce in a complex experimental design. 
 
  
                                                 
8 In some cases, to improve the accuracy of the prediction, subjects are rewarded on the basis of the success 
of the expectation.  
9  Specifically, the authors find that the subjects' answers to the questionnaire and their  reported belief 
are correlated when the individuals are calculating the expected amount returned especially if they are 
sending a large amount of money; otherwise, for a small amount of money sent, the belief reflects the 
"anticipated level of retaliation rather than the general level of trust. This suggests that the WVS question is 
a good measure of the expectation component of trust in economically-relevant situations". (p. 3). In their 
concluding notes, the authors also stress that - in order to assess the exact nature of this correlation - it is 
important to evaluate the level of homogeneity of the population that is the object of the study, in the sense 
that the correlation tends to be significant in heterogeneous samples.  
   11
More conventionally, we measured some preference characteristics of the senders' 
behavior by using dictators' games and lotteries and self-reported measures of the risk 
attitude. As regards the individuals' level of altruism and generosity that is incorporated 
in the individuals' utility function, several studies (Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006) have 
considered the behavior of the Dictators as a proxy of the generosity component of the 
trustors' decision in the Trust Game  Therefore, in  modeling the senders choices, we use 
the data from the Dictator Game as a measure of individuals' generosity. Finally,  we 
selected two measures of risk - lotteries as in Holt - Laury (2004), and self reported 
measures as in Fehr (2009).  
We do not make strong behavioral hypotheses: our main interest is to see whether 
trusting (or untrusting) behavior  is contagious in the periods 6-20 of the Trust Game. 
Specifically, we model the individual decision to trust as follows: 
) , , , , ( j i i i i i i x z t g r x x − =              (3) 
where i x  is the number of tokens sent to an anonymous recipient by trustor i in each 
period, r i and g iare measures of social preferences (respectively, individual risk and 
generosity), t i indicates the trustee’s beliefs (namely, expected trustworthiness) while z i 
indicates individual socio-demographic characteristics. Our main interest however 
concerns the impact on the trustor’s decision of variable  j x− , the observed average 
number of tokens sent by his/her neighbours in the previous period. 
We consider the following hypotheses: 
H1:  0 ≠ ∂ ∂ − j i x x  Peer influence exists, in the sense that senders modify their behavior 
as a result of their observation of other trustors. A related aspect concerns the overall 
impact of peer influence on trust. Indeed, if the hypothesis is accepted, it is interesting to 
ascertain whether contagion has a positive effect on trust levels. 
The analysis of individuals' characteristics however allows us to extend our inspection 
to a further aspect.  
H2:  How do an individual's characteristics impact on social influence? Is social 
influence greater (smaller) in groups having homogeneous characteristics or does 
homogeneity tend to reduce contagion?   12
In the following, we provide answers to both questions by first examining the 
experimental data set and then by estimating model (3) on the Trust Game data. 
 
 
4. The trust game: the results  
4.1 A descriptive analysis 
In the trust game the average number of tokens sent by the trustors varies considerably 
across the 15 neighbourhoods, from a minimum of 0.15 in the first neighbourhood to 3.60  
in the 9
th neighbourhood. Furthermore, some neighbourhoods exhibit a decreasing trust 
across the periods (i.e. neighbourhoods 1, 4, 5, 7), in other cases trust increases (i.e. in 
neighbourhood 12 and, very slightly,  in neighbourhoods 6 and 9), while in others it does 
not vary significantly (i.e. in neighbourhoods 2, 3, 10). Overall, the prevailing trend is a 
reduction of trust across the periods.  
  Our main interest in the trust game concerns the presence of contagion however.  We 
find evidence of positive peer effects. In this section, support for this result comes from 
figures 1-17.  
Figures 1 and 2 plot the average number of tokens sent by each trustor as a function of 
the average amount previously sent by their neighbours in the 5
th period (when trustors do 
not observe their neighbours) and later on, respectively. In the absence of contagion, 
these graphs should fluctuate around 0. As expected, Figure 1 does not display evidence 
of contagion while Figure 2 shows that, on average, subjects send a lower (higher) 
number of tokens after observing their neighbours sending few (many) tokens.  
Figures 3-17 look at the trustors’ choices from another perspective: for each 
neighbourhood, they display the number of tokens sent by each trustor during the 20 
rounds of the game. In the absence of imitation, we should observe similar trends in 
individual trust before and after the fifth period. On the contrary, in many cases we 
observe individuals changing their behaviour and converging on similar patterns
10: 
overall, at least 20% of our players are clearly affected by others’ behaviour
11 while only 
                                                 
10 For example, in neighbourhood 1, trustor 1 sends large amounts to his trustee in the first five rounds of 
the game, but his trust collapses to “0” after observing his neighbours’ behaviour; similarly, trustor 27 
exhibits an increasing trust thus following his neighbours’ behaviour. 
11 See trustors 15,17, 21, 25, 27, 32, 35, 39, 42.   13
7 out of 45 individuals display no contagion effects at all  (i.e. they send “0” tokens each 
time).  
Overall, most neighbourhoods (at least 8 out of 15) display contagion effects, with an 
increasing trust in some of them (in particular, in neighbourhoods 6, 9, 12), and a 
decreasing trust in others (i.e. in neighbourhoods 1, 4, 5, 7, 13).  
  In order to further investigate individual heterogeneity in imitating, table 2 reports 
spearman rho correlation coefficients for the 45 trustors during rounds 6-20: only 10 
individuals have a negative (but never significant) coefficient, 7 individuals have a 
coefficient of exactly “0” and all the others have a positive coefficient. Hence, the most 
interesting finding here is an ample heterogeneity in individuals’ reaction to the 
observation of other trustors. The main conclusion is that, consistently with previous 
studies in this field (Glaeser et al., 1996; Falk et al. 2009), it could be argued that two 
classes of subjects exist, those whose behaviour is influenced by the behaviour of their 
neighbours and those whose behaviour is independent of others.  
 
4.2 Looking at social preferences and beliefs 
Information on trustors’ generosity is drawn from the dictator game: as in Eckel and 
Grossman (1998), individuals are classified as  “generous”  when their donations are 
greater than the mean donation in the sample (equal to 0.5 tokens). Our measures of risk 
aversion are based on both questionnaire and laboratory data: in the first case, we use an 
experimentally validated measure of risk preference (Dohmen et al., 2005; Fehr, 2009) 
which is based on a question drawn from the German Socio - Economic Panel: ”Are you, 
generally speaking, a person who is fully prepared to take risks, or do you try to avoid 
taking risks?”. The respondents answered this question on an 11-point Likert Scale 
ranging from 0 (very risk averse) to 10 (very risk-seeking).  In the second case, we 
measure risk preferences through the well-known lottery method suggested by Holt - 
Laury (2002). 
According to the evidence reported in table 2,  sampled individuals are mainly selfish 
and risk averse (whichever index we consider) .  
In the following, our measures of individual risk aversion rely on the questionnaire data. 
There are several reasons for our choice: i) lottery choices are inconsistent in 10 out of 45   14
cases
12; ii) our questionnaire data provide a higher variability in risk aversion across the 
different observations; iii) most information drawn from the questionnaire is coherent 
with the observed behavior in the trust game. On this last point, for example, we observe 
that most players reporting a score higher than 5 (the mean value in the sample) on the 
risk aversion question are also classified as “risk loving” in the lottery game (we find 
coherence between the two measures in 68% of cases) and, in 75% of cases, they exhibit 
trusting behavior during the trust game (see figures 3-17). 
The classification of the risk and generosity characteristics makes possible a preliminary 
answer to one of this paper’s research questions, that is whether imitation of trusting 
behavior is an effect of social influence or of individuals imitating similar types. If the 
second hypothesis prevailed, then we should observe the most generous and less risk 
averse individuals following only trusting neighbors (and vice versa). 
In order to highlight the most significant patterns in the game, on the one hand we 
consider the individuals classified as risk seeking and generous (that is to say, those 
individuals who reported a score higher than the mean value “5” on the risk question and 
a generosity index equal to 1
13)  and, on the other hand, we take into account the 
“opposite types” 
14.  
First, figures 3-17 show that only in two cases is the subjects’ behavior in the trust game 
not coherent with the profiles reported in table 2 (see trustors numbered as 16 and 18). 
Second, we find that more generous and less risk averse players increase their trust 
when they meet trusting neighbors, while, in the other cases, they often end up by 
imitating “distrusting neighbors” (and this happens at least 4 times out of 6). On the 
contrary, less generous and more risk averse players clearly exhibit contagion effects only 
in 3 out of 14 cases. These findings are consistent with the observed trust variation across 
                                                 
12 In the lottery game, our subjects take 10 decisions between a safe option (option A) and a risky one 
(option B). The risk neutral choice pattern consists of 4 safe choices (when the probability of a high payoff 
for both the safe and the risky option is low) followed by 6 risky choices (when the probability of a high 
payoff for both the safe and the risky option increases to 10/10).  When individuals switch to the risky 
option before the fourth choice, they are considered as risk seeking (symmetrically, they are considered as 
risk averse when they switch to the risky option after the fourth choice). We observe 10 individuals making 
inconsistent choices in that they switch back from the risky to the safe option later in the game. 
13 More specifically, now we are considering the trustors numbered as  9, 15, 17, 18, 25, 27, 32, 33, 34, 39, 
42 in table 2. 
14 These individuals reported a generosity index of “0” and a score below 5 on the risk aversion question (in 
table 2, they are numbered as  3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 23, 28, 31, 38, 40, 45). 
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neighborhoods: those characterized by a majority of generous and less risk averse 
individuals (i.e. neighborhoods 6, 11, 9) exhibit a higher and increasing trust; the opposite 
evidence is reported for neighborhoods composed of selfish individuals (i.e. 
neighborhood 1); the prevailing trend is a reduction in trust across the periods, in line 
with the evidence of a majority of selfish/risk averse individuals that also affect others’ 
behavior during the whole game.   
Finally, let’s compare trustors’ beliefs about recipients’ trustworthiness (elicited 
through our questionnaire) and trustors’ behavior during the game. The majority of our 
players (about 74%) reported a score higher than the mean value “5” on the WVS 
responses
15; in most cases we find a good correspondence between attitudinal and 
behavioral measures of trust
16 (for example, see trustors numbered 9, 26 and 34) and, in 
some cases, we observe such a correspondence only in the first rounds of the game (see 
trustors 10, 29 and, in particular, trustors 6 and 27).  
To sum up, the most important patterns emerging here are: i) many - but not all - 
trustors are affected by social influence; ii) social preferences are likely to explain, at 
least in part, individual heterogeneity in imitating: generous and less risk averse 
individuals display a high propensity to imitate others’ behavior and, when they are 
grouped with similar neighbors, their trust increases; iii) even if social preferences play a 
major role in explaining trustors’ behavior, expected trustworthiness also matters.  
 
5. Estimating peer effects 
5.1.  Experimental and econometric issues in the analysis of peer effect. 
As noted in Falk and Ichino (2003), the correct identification of peer influence is not an 
easy task. The experimental methodology however allows us to overcome some of the 
basic problems that arise every time we try to identify contagion effects.   
                                                 
15 See section 3 about the correlation between such survey questions and individual beliefs. The index 
shown in table 2 has been obtained by averaging the scores reported on the two questions : “Generally 
speaking, would you say that you can trust most people?” and “generally speaking, would you say that one 
can never be too careful?”. The index varies from 0 to 10 (higher values indicate higher trust in others).  
16 In 11 out of 45 cases we do not find consistency between questionnaire data and trustors’ behaviour (for 
example,  trustors 12, 18, 23, 38 and 43, reported high score on the WVS questions but they sent 0 or few 
tokens to their recipients in many rounds; the opposite evidence is reported for trustors 1, 24, 32, 33, 39 and 
44). In most of these cases individual behaviour is consistent with individual social preferences.   16
Basically, the identification of peer effects poses different econometric issues (e.g. 
Manski, 1993, 2000) because other factors (other than causal peer effects) can create 
spurious correlations in agents’ behavior. The primary potential sources of problems are 
i) self-selection or endogenous group formation in that individuals with similar 
preferences may tend to form social groups; hence, observed correlation in their actions 
may reflect individuals’ similar preferences and not a causal effect of one’s action on 
another; ii) correlated unobservables might influence all group members in a similar way: 
individuals in a given group may behave similarly because they are similar or because 
they face a similar institutional environment; iii) simultaneity problems due to the 
potential simultaneity of decisions: group behavior affects agent’s behavior, which in 
turn, affects the group’s behavior (and these problems are even greater in small groups: 
Moffit, 2001; Krauth, 2002).  
These issues have been extensively addressed in Manski (1993) and, more recently, in 
Hartmann et al. (2008).  
  First, we treated the self selection problem by randomly allocating our subjects to 
groups in our experiments (for a similar experimental procedure, see Falk et al., 2009). 
Moreover, potential correlated effects are treated as follows. In the experiment, the 
contexts in which individuals take their decisions are identical: the three subjects in each 
neighborhood are provided with the same budget and the same incentives and they share 
equal information (Falk et al. 2009). Correlated effects could arise however with respect 
to time: for example, if all subjects decided, for whichever reason, to reduce their trust 
from one period to the next, then we would observe correlation in observed actions and 
we could misattribute it to causal peer effects. We check for unobserved correlates by 
regressing the behavior of each trustor on the behavior of a couple of trustors randomly 
drawn from the sample (not the couple actually observed): if we observed a significant 
correlation in an agent’s actions then we should admit the existence of a spurious 
correlation in our data. 
Furthermore, the availability of panel data enables us to mitigate problems of 
unobserved (individual and time) correlated effects via the inclusion of both (time and 
individual) fixed effects and random effects accounting for individual heterogeneity 
(Hartmann et al. 2008).   17
Finally, simultaneity problems are taken into account by estimating peer effects via 
instrumental variables that affect an agent’s decision but that can be a priori excluded 
from the decision of others in the reference group (Sacerdote, 2001; Hartmann et al. 
2008).  
 
5.2 The estimation results 
Underlying our econometric analysis is a simple framework in which the trustor’s 
action (the number of tokens sent to an anonymous recipient) in period t depends both on 
his/her own propensity to trust and on the observed neighbors’ actions (the average 
number of tokens sent by each neighbor to his/her trustee) in period t-1(see 3)). Overall, 
we consider the fifteen periods in which individuals actually observe their neighbors’ 
actions. 
In table 3, we check for potential unobserved correlates through the inclusion of 
individual and period fixed effects: column (1) shows the Ols regression of his/her own 
action (in time t) on neighbors’ actions (in period t-1)
17. The coefficient on “neighbors’ 
actions” is 0.208 and it is statistically significant at 1 %  level. The null hypothesis  of no 
peer effects would predict no relationship between his/her own action and others’ actions, 
and the data reject that null. Taking into account that a large fraction of subjects sent “0” 
tokens to the anonymous recipient, estimates in column (2) are based on a tobit model
18: 
the coefficient on others’ actions is now 0.322 and it is still statistically significant at 1% 
level so that, once again, the null hypothesis of no peer effects cannot be accepted.  
In columns (3)  of table 3 we check for unobserved correlates (in particular, for time 
effects) by regressing each trustor’s action (in period t) on the behavior of a couple of 
neighbors (in period t-1) randomly drawn from the sample and, as expected, we do not 
observe a statistically significant correlation among individuals’ choices; similar results 
based on a tobit model specification - are reported in column (4).  
                                                 
17 We also run OLS regression between “own action” in time t and “neighbors’ type” in time t-1 for each 
period (with robust standard errors clustered at neighborhood level) and we found significant peer effects in 
13 out of 15 cases (only in the 6
th and in the 9
th were the Ols estimates not significant). 
18 In line with the latent linear – in- mean model, the equation for X*i – the  latent variable for Xi in 
equation 3), can be written as  ) , , , , (
* *
j i i i i i i x z t g r x x − =    18
In table 4, we explain individual trust, taking account of individual exogenous 
characteristics (demographic variables, propensity to risk, generosity and expected 
trustworthiness). Our estimates add interesting new evidence for the analysis of  trustors’ 
preferences and behavior in that decisions to trust are significantly and positively 
correlated not only with individual generosity but also with risk attitudes (see section 2 
for a review of the previous findings in this context). The coefficient estimated on the 
“expected trustworthiness” variable however is statistically significant at a ten percent 
level only in the first five rounds of the game
19 (one could argue that beliefs change 
during the game - when trustors observe neighbors’ actions – so that they no longer 
explain individual behavior).  
Finally, in table 5 we investigate the presence of social influence by including random 
effects to check for individual heterogeneity. We report separate estimates for different 
periods in order to elicit any variations during the twenty rounds: we analyze trustors’ 
behavior in the first 5 rounds (when we do not expect to observe peer effects
20), in the 
next 5 rounds (in order to observe whether individuals change their behavior when 
observing peers’ decisions), and, finally, in the remaining 10 rounds.  
 In order to measure individual preferences, for more simplicity, we consider a single 
index (“own type”) obtained by averaging generosity and risk aversion indexes at 
individual level; gender and age dummies were the only socio-demographic variables 
significant at least at 10% level, so they are included in the final model specification
21.   
To check for correlated effects, a variable describing neighbors’ generosity and risk 
preferences is included in the set of explanatory variables
22 (the variable “neighbors’ 
type”
 has been obtained by averaging neighbors’ generosity and risk aversion indexes).  
The most interesting finding for our goal is the coefficient on “neighbors’ actions”, 
which are large and statistically significant in columns (3) and (7), while the “neighbors’ 
                                                 
19 When we consider 6
th -10
th periods, we find statistical significance; however, in this case, the coefficient 
on “expected trustworthiness” is estimated with the wrong sign and it is not statistically significant when 
we do not include generosity and risk aversion  in the set of explanatory variables.  
20 We also test for spurious correlation in our data by regressing own action on neighbors’ actions during 
rounds 2-5 and, as expected, we do not find statistically significant peer effects (results not reported here 
but available on request).  
21 For analogous reasons we do not include trustors’ expected trustworthiness among the regressors. 
22 Similar results rely on the OLS specification (as in the linear model specification by Manski, 1993). The 
inclusion of neighbors’ sex and age does not affect our results in table 4.   19
type” variable has a small and insignificant effect. However, when the “neighbors’ 
action” variable is dropped from the model specification in columns (4) and (8), the 
estimated coefficients for “neighbors’ type” are statistically significant at least at 1% 
level
23. Now, the latter coefficients can be interpreted as causal since the relative variable 
is not subject to the reflection problem (see Sacerdote, 2001).  
When considering the marginal effects, the “neighbors’ type” variable raises the 
dependent variable by 0.48 in column (4) and by 1.14 in column (8); at the same time, the 
estimated marginal effects for the “own type” variable are 1.39 and 1.71, respectively.  
These figures imply that the peer effect  is at least 30% percent as large as the own effect 
and it also increases during the game. 
A further aim here is to understand whether and to what extent the existence of peer 
effects depends on social preferences. To this respect, in columns (5) and (9) we focus on 
trustors’ and neighbors’ characteristics: in column (5) the coefficient estimated on the 
“trusting” dummy variable indicates that trusting people are more likely to trust when 
they are grouped with trusting neighbors; the opposite is true when we consider the 
coefficient estimated on the “untrusting” dummy variable (untrusting individuals reduce 
their trust when they are grouped with similar types). In the last rounds, the prevailing 
trend is a reduction of trust but, once again, more generous and less risk averse 
individuals are willing to trust when they observe trusting behavior. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Can Trust be influenced by the observed behavior of other trustors rather than the 
expectation of monetary benefits? Our research provides a positive answer to this 
question. Most subjects in our experiments change their behavior from the sixth period 
onwards, and the change does not set in only at the end of the session, therefore it cannot 
be attributed to boredom (see Table 5). Our research reveals interesting aspects of the 
problem. First, not all people are influenced by peers: some seem to be more inclined to 
social stimuli than others. Indeed, two categories may be broadly identified: on the one 
hand, subjects  who on average send no tokens from the first period and appear to be 
                                                 
23 In preliminary estimates, we regressed trustors’ characteristics on neighbors’ characteristics (in order to 
test whether they were correlated in the sample) and we did not report any significant estimate.   20
ungenerous and risk adverse and, from the sixth onwards, seem to be less affected by the 
choices of others. On the other hand, there are subjects who have the opposite 
characteristics and seem to be very sensitive to social stimuli. The latter category of 
individuals imitate more than the former and, when positioned in homogeneous groups, 
increase the number of tokens sent as a result of imitative behavior.  
Second, the social effect here seems to have a negative impact on the number of tokens 
sent, on average, in the groups, but this result is strictly dependent on the fact that we 
have a majority of untrusting individuals: the tendency is a decrease in the number of 
tokens and untrusting individuals do not change their behavior even when they observe a 
completely different strategy.  
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APPENDIX II: THE INSTRUCTIONS  
 
Please note that subjects read the Instructions directly on the computer screen and each part was presented separately. 
Before the experiment started, they only knew that the session would take between one hour and one hour and half and 
the experiments comprised different parts. We here report the Instructions for the A players. The Instructions for the B 
players differed for the Dictator and the Trust Game. While playing as recipients in Trust Game, B players were not 
allocated to groups.  
 
Instructions for the A players 
 
Welcome to our experiment! Today you are participating in an economic experiment that will help our research and  
will enable you  to earn a fair amount of money. The experiment comprises several parts, and the Instructions for each 
section will appear on your screen when a part of the experiment is completed by all the subjects. Read these 
Instructions carefully and do not hesitate to ask if you find them unclear. Please do not communicate with other 
subjects in the room. 
 
General Information 
 
Earnings: You will get 2 Euro as participation fee. During the experiment, you will receive tokens (Exchange rate 1 
token = 1 Euro cent). The experiment is divided into four parts, one of which is a simple questionnaire. You will not be 
paid for filling the questionnaire. As for the remaining parts, you will be paid according to your decision in the part 
where a single decision is required. In the two remaining parts where a series of choices are required, the computer  (at 
the end of the session) will randomly select one single period and you will be paid accordingly. Please notice that at the 
end of the experiment, the payment scheme, the table summing up your earnings for each decision in the three parts of 
the experiment will be presented on your screen;  then,  the computer will select the period to which the payment is 
referred and you will be paid immediately after.  
 
The role: At the start of the experiment, the computer will divide all the participants in two groups: A and B. You will 
be told in the next screen which is your  role: please keep in mind that, once the role is selected, it will be kept 
throughout the four parts of the experiment: if you are A, you will play in that role for all the session.  
 
 
The Questionnaire 
 
Please fill the questionnaire that will appear on your screen (see Appendix III) 
 
 
The Dictator Game 
 
The organizers are allocating 200 tokens to you; you have to decide how many tokens you are keeping for yourself and 
how many tokens you wish to send to an anonymous B player who received nothing. Your will keep for yourself the 
remaining  tokens.   
 
The Trust Game 
 
This part is composed by 20 periods (decisions). From the 5th onwards, you will positioned in a group with two other A 
players. The composition of the groups is fixed: from fifteen periods  you will therefore be in the same group.  
 
In each period, the organizers allocate 600 tokens to you; you have to decide how many tokens you want to keep for 
yourself and how many tokens you want to send to an anonymous B player who has no endowment. The B player 
receives the tokens sent by you multiplied by three. For example, if you sent  200 tokens, he\she will receive 600 
tokens; if you sent 100 tokens, he\she will receive 300 tokens, and so forth. The B player with which you are coupled is 
informed on the number of tokens he received;  then, he is asked how many tokens he wants to return to you. You will 
be informed on the B players' decisions only at the end of the experiment, when a table appears on the screen reporting 
- for each stage - the tokens sent and the tokens returned. 
 
You will be asked to take 20 decisions on the number of tokens to send to the always-different B player. 
PLEASE NOTICE THAT, FROM THE FIFTH PERIOD TO THE TWENTIENTH (THE PERIODS IN WHICH YOU 
ARE PART OF A GROUP) YOU WILL BE INFORMED ON THE NUMBER OF TOKENS SENT BY THE OTHER 
TWO A PLAYERS WHO ARE IN YOUR GROUP: the graphic of the screen will make this information clear.  
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Summing up:  a) in each of the 20 periods you receive 600 tokens; the decision you have to take is always the same: 
how many tokens you want to keep for yourself and how many tokens you send to a B player who receives the amount  
multiplied by three and is then asked if he wishes to return tokens to you. The B players vary from period to period; b) 
from the fifth to the twentieth period, you will be in a group with two more A players and you will informed of their 
choices for that period; at the end of the experiment, when the payment is computed for each part, a table will appear 
on your screen summing up your 20 decisions, the decisions of the B players with whom you were coupled for that 
specific stage. 
 
READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY: DO NOT HESITATE TO ASK FOR EXPLANATIONS IF YOU 
FIND THEM UNCLEAR. 
 
 
The lotteries 
 
The table that will appear shortly on your screen asks you to choose  between a "X" and a "Y" option for ten different 
choices. Please indicate your decision for each of  the ten options. 
 
The payment stage 
 
Welcome to the payment stage! We remind you that you earn 2 Euro as a participation fee. 
 
1) Payment for the Dictator Game: You earn 200 tokens less the amount of tokens sent to the B player. 
2) Payment for the lotteries: on your screen it will appear the table summing up your ten choices. Now the computer  
randomly select one of the ten choices and then the card will turned up and you will be paid accordingly. 
3) Payment for the Trust Game: on your screen it will appear the table summing up your twenty decisions and the 
twenty decision taken by the specific B player with whom you were coupled for that specific period. Now the computer  
randomly select one of the twenty decisions and you will be paid accordingly.  
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 1 - Average number of tokens sent by the trustors in each neighborhood – (std. deviations in parentheses)   
 
PERIODS 
NEIGHBORHOODS   
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 tot. 
1 0.7 
(1.21) 
1.33  
(0.58) 
0.83 
(0.70) 
1.67 
(1.52) 
 1.60 
(0.79) 
0.68 
(1.14) 
0.93 
(0.75) 
 0.85 
(0.99) 
2.00 
(2.64) 
2.33 
(2.66) 
1.73 
(2.83) 
0.83 
(1.04) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
1.39 
(1.43) 
2 0.53 
(0.84) 
2.35 
(2.29) 
0.50 
(0.80) 
1.33 
(1.15) 
1.50 
(1) 
2.03 
(1.72) 
1.08 
(1.83) 
1.10 
(0.36) 
2.83 
(1.82) 
1.17 
(1.59) 
2.66 
(2.52) 
2.50 
(2.29) 
1.70 
(2.86) 
1.00 
(1.73) 
0.5 
(0.5) 
1.52 
(1.62) 
3 0.50   
(0.86) 
2.67 
(2.08) 
0.63 
(1.09) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
2,00 
(1.73) 
2.72 
(1.99) 
0.64 
(1.09) 
1.22 
(0.81) 
2.60 
(2.08) 
2.40 
(2.42) 
2.33 
(2.25) 
2.57 
(2.40) 
1.68 
(2.87) 
1.33 
(1.15) 
0.17 
(0.28) 
1.61 
(1.72) 
4 0.50 
(0.87) 
2.16 
(2.47) 
0.87 
(0.81) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
0.90 
(0.79) 
2.88 
(1.91) 
0.38 
(0.46) 
1.03 
(1.10) 
3.08 
(1.66) 
1.60 
(2.08) 
0.83 
(3.33) 
2.00 
(2.65) 
2.00 
(2.64) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
1.31 
(1.61) 
5 0.53 
(0.84) 
0.6 
(0.53) 
0.42 
(0.72) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
2.45 
(2.36) 
2.49 
(2.17) 
1.43 
(2.31) 
0.96 
(0.81) 
3.46 
(1.47) 
0.67 
(0.41) 
2.67 
(2.52) 
3.20 
(2.70) 
1.67 
(2.89) 
1.00 
(1.73) 
1.36 
(2.29) 
1.64 
(1.88) 
6 0.07 
(0.11) 
0.5 
(0.5) 
0.53 
(0.92) 
1.67 
(0.58) 
1.50 
(0.86) 
1.83 
(1.46) 
0.5 
(0.87) 
0.70 
(0.26) 
3.83 
(0.65) 
0.48 
(0.45) 
1.67 
(2.89) 
3.50 
(1.32) 
2.33 
(2.31) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
1.01 
(1.72) 
1.41 
(1.57) 
7 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.43 
(0.51) 
0.40 
(0.69) 
1.17 
(1.04) 
1,00 
(0.50) 
2.70 
(1.99) 
0.83 
(1.04) 
0.7 
(0.29) 
3.86 
(0.11) 
0.90 
(0.98) 
1.33 
(2.31) 
3.83 
(1.25) 
2.33 
(2.31) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.69 
(1.13) 
1.39 
(1.61) 
8 0.03 
(0.06) 
0.6 
(0.53) 
0.53 
(0.92) 
1.35 
(1.12) 
0.98 
(0.92) 
2.10 
(1.15) 
0.4 
(0.69) 
0.73 
(0.21) 
4.03 
(0.15) 
0.90 
(0.95) 
1.00 
(1.73) 
3.83 
(1.04) 
2.00 
(2.65) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
1.00 
(1.00) 
1.36 
(1.51) 
9 0  0.67 
(0.58) 
0.47 
(0.81) 
1.33 
(0.58) 
1.23 
(1.55) 
1.03 
(0.61) 
1.33 
(2.31) 
0.67 
(0.29) 
3.93 
(0.40) 
0.37 
(0.23) 
2.33 
(2.52) 
3.33 
(1.26) 
2.00 
(2.65) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
1.00 
(1.73) 
1.25 
(1.50) 
10 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.60 
(1.09) 
1.33 
(1.53) 
0.97 
(0.55) 
1.65 
(1.19) 
0.70 
(1.21) 
0.90 
(0.53) 
3.56 
(0.49) 
1.23 
(1.54) 
1.50 
(2.60) 
2.83 
(2.25) 
1.67 
(2.89) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.69 
(1.14) 
1.31 
(1.52) 
11 0.006 
(0.001) 
0.73 
(0.23) 
0 1.33 
(1.15) 
0.82 
(0.55) 
1.78 
(0.68) 
0.72 
(1.07) 
0.83 
(0.29) 
4.17 
(0.72) 
1.10 
(0.85) 
2.67 
(2.52) 
3.67 
(1.89) 
2.00 
(2.65) 
0.50 
(0.87) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
1.28 
(1.58) 
12 0.012 
(0.021) 
0.10 
(0.17) 
0 0.33 
(0.58) 
1,00 
(1,00) 
1.96 
(0.89) 
0.93 
(1.62) 
0.70 
(0.35) 
4.27 
(0.47) 
1.97 
(1.84) 
2.50 
(2.50) 
3.83 
(1.61) 
2.00 
(2.65) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
1.38 
(1.72) 
13 0.01 
(0.017) 
0 0  1.67 
(1.53) 
1.33 
(1.53) 
2.19 
(0.70) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.90 
(0.36) 
3.70 
(1.18) 
1.23 
(1.39) 
2.00 
(2.64) 
4.50 
(0.50) 
2.00 
(2.65) 
0.50 
(0.87) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
1.42 
(1.76) 
14 0.033 
(0.057) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.4 
(0.69) 
0.83 
(0.29) 
1.17 
(0.29) 
2.80 
(1.08) 
1.67 
(2.89) 
0.70 
(0.26) 
3.80 
(0.46) 
1.77 
(1.43) 
2.50 
(2.50) 
3.83 
(2.02) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.35 
(0.57) 
1.40 
(1.73) 
15 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.44 
(0.75) 
0.50 
(0.87) 
1.33 
(1.16) 
2,00 
(1.99) 
0.27 
(0.46) 
1.17 
(0.65) 
3.33 
(1.36) 
1.37 
(1.20) 
1.33 
(1.26) 
2.36 
(1.76) 
0 0.50 
(0.87) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
1.15 
(1.40) 
16 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.27 
(0.46) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
1.33 
(1.53) 
0.67 
(0.58) 
2.33 
(0.58) 
0.33 
(0.57) 
0.97 
(0.15) 
3.58 
(0.52) 
0.68 
(0.76) 
1.83 
(2.75) 
4.33 
(1.15) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.34 
(0.57) 
1.10 
(1.43) 
17 0.013 
(0.015) 
0.37 
(0.55) 
0.37 
(0.55) 
1.33 
(1.15) 
1.17 
(1.26) 
2.83 
(1.61) 
0.70 
(1.21) 
0.78 
(0.68) 
4.35 
(0.64) 
1.75 
(2.39) 
2.50 
(2.50) 
3.86 
(0.79) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.50 
(0.87) 
0.35 
(0.57) 
1.36 
(1.67) 
18 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.35) 
0.43 
(0.75) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.33 
(0.29) 
2.43 
(1.72) 
0.66 
(1.14) 
0.68 
(0.58) 
4.19 
(0.84) 
0.50 
(0.87) 
2.33 
(2.50) 
2.99 
(1.71) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
1.11 
(1.54) 
19 0.017 
(0.015) 
0.33 
(0.58) 
0.53 
(0.92) 
1.99 
(1.05) 
0.84 
(0.76) 
3.17 
(2.02) 
0.12 
(0.20) 
0.67 
(0.47) 
3.35 
(1.28) 
1.23 
(1.96) 
2.33 
(2.50) 
3.80 
(2.08) 
0 0  0.33 
(0.58) 
1.36 
(1.74) 
20 0.007 
(0.011) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.87) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
1.21 
(1.56) 
2.54 
(2.15) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.63 
(0.23) 
3.30 
(0.72) 
2.20 
(2.52) 
1.67 
(2.88) 
4.58 
(3.70) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.67 
(1.15) 
1.24 
(1.72) 
Tot. 0.15    0.76  0.42 1.08 1.18 2.25 0.68 0.85 3.60 1.28 2.05 3.38 1.39 0.62 0.61 1.35 Table 2 : individual generosity and risk preferences    
 
neighborhood 
 
             trustor 
 
ρ 
 
generosity 
Risk aversion     
 
Expected 
trustwort. 
   Risk 
preference 
question 
         Lottery method 
                                       
 1  0.45  *  0  5  n.c.    2 
1  2  0.29   0  4    Stay in bed    5   
 3  “000”  0  3  Very  risky  averse    1 
  4  0.66 **  0  5  Risk averse    3 
2  5  0.04   0  4    Highly risky averse    4.5   
 6  “000”  0  4  Risk  averse    7 
 7  “000”  0  3  Very  risk  averse    3.5 
3  8  “000”  0  5    Very rusk averse    3   
 9  -0.14  1  7  Highly  risk  loving  5.5 
 10  -0.6***  0  5  Risk  neutral  5.5 
4 11  -0.04  0  3    Risk  averse   3   
 12  0.17  0  5  Risk  neutral  6   
 13  0.35°  0  2  n.c.  1.5 
5 14  0.02  0  4    Risk  neutral   3   
 15  0.16  1  7  n.c.  4   
 16  0.50**  0  3  Risk  averse  3 
6 17  -0.24  1  6    Risk  loving   6.5   
 18  -0.003  1  6  Risk  averse  6 
 19  0.33  0  2  Very  risk  averse  4   
7 20  “000”  0  8    Risk  averse   4   
  21  0.29  0  10  Slightly risk averse  5   
 22  0.21  0  5  n.c.  3   
8  23  -0.04  0  7    Slightly risk averse    7   
 24  0.13  1  2  Very  risk  averse  3.5 
 25  -0.5***  1  8  Very  risk  averse  5   
9 26  0.37°  1  3    Very  risk  averse    5.5   
 27  0.91***  1  6  Risk  averse  3   
 28  0.85***  0  8  n.c.  5   
10 29  -0.01  0  10    n.c.    7.5   
 30  -0.17  0  5  n.c.  5   
 31  “000”  0  2  Risk  averse  5   
11  32  0.79***  1  7    Slightly risk averse    2.5   
  33  0.46 *  1  5  Risk averse  2.5 
 34  -0.11  1  10  n.c.  6   
12 35  -0.03  0  7    n.c.    3.5   
 36  0.34  0  4  n.c.  4   
 37  0.18  0  4  Very  risk  averse  2   
13 38  0.28  0  3    Risk  averse    5.5   
 39  0.44  1  5  Very  risk  averse  3   
 40  “000”  0  7  Risk  neutral  3   
14  41  “000”  0  4    Stay in bed    1.5   
 42  0  1  5  Highly  risk  averse  4   
 43  0.30  0  4  Risk  averse  5.5 
15 44  0.43*  0  6    Highly  risk  averse    3   
 45  “000”  0  2  Risk  averse  5   
Legend: ***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level; 
°statistically significant at 20% level. Notes: When individuals do not send any token,  we report “000”. 
  
Table 3- Ols^ and two-limit Tobit^^ fixed effect estimates  
 Ols  estimates 
Fixed effects 
6
th -20
th periods 
Tobit estimates 
Fixed effects 
6
th -20
th periods 
Ols estimates 
Fixed effects 
6
th -20
th periods 
Tobit estimates 
Fixed effects 
6
th -20
th periods 
Variables Coeff.  (std.err.) 
         (1) 
Coeff. (std.err.) 
          (2) 
Coeff. (std.err.) 
          (3) 
Coeff. (std.err.) 
          (4) 
 
Neighbors’ action 
 
0.208***(0.059) 
 
0.322 (0.087)*** 
 
-0.00059 (0.0006) 
 
-0.0009 (0.0008) 
Log- lik.  
n. of observations 
-827.333 
675 
-731.085 
675 
-839.69 
675 
-738.082 
675 
 Legend: Neighbors’ action: average number of tokens sent by the neighbors in the previous round. ***statistically significant at 1% level.  individual 
and time fixed effects included. 
 
 
 
  Table 4 –Tobit estimates of individual trust –  random effects (std. errors in parentheses)
 2
nd – 5
th periods  6
th – 10
th periods  11
th- 15
th periods  16
th – 20
th periods 
Age 
 
Sex (male=0) 
 
Generosity 
 
Risk aversion 
 
Expected trustworthiness 
 
 
-0.636 
(0.096) 
0.146 
(0.396) 
1.721*** 
(0.303) 
0.310*** 
(0.091) 
0.169* 
(0.104) 
 
-0.356*** 
(0.061) 
-1.114 
(0.214)*** 
2.487*** 
(0.210) 
0.451*** 
(0.059) 
-0.110* 
(0.058) 
 
-0.391*** 
(0.100) 
-1.686*** 
(0.444) 
2.727*** 
(0.505) 
0.529*** 
(0.098) 
0.030 
(0.139) 
 -0.207*** 
(0.076) 
-0.912*** 
(0.312) 
2.991*** 
(0.429) 
0.586*** 
(0.092) 
-0.027 
(0.137) 
 
Log-lik 
Restr. L. L. 
n. observ.s 
-254.179 
-297.775 
180 
-266.817 
-337.526 
225 
-289.012 
-333.525 
225 
-282.317 
-338.580 
225 
Notes: constant and period dummies are  included but not reported.  
 Legend: Generosity: index for trustor’s generosity drawn from the dictator game (dummy= 1 if generous, 0 otherwise). 
Risk aversion: risk aversion index drawn from our questionnaire data (lower values indicate higher risk aversion). 
Expected trustworthiness: index drawn from the WVS question on trustworthiness (higher values indicate higher 
trustworthiness). ***statistically significant at 1% level; **statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 
10% level; °statistically significant at 20% level. ^lower and upper limits: 0,6. 
 
 
 
   Table 5 – Tobit^ estimates of peer effects – random effects  (std. errors in parentheses)
 2
nd  - 5
th 
periods 
6
th – 10
th  periods    11
th- 20
th  periods     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Age 
 
Sex (male=0) 
 
 
Own type 
 
Neighbors’ 
action 
 
Neighbors’ 
type 
 
Untrusting 
 
Trusting 
 
-0.061 
0.101 
-0.871** 
(0.448) 
 
2.747*** 
(0.671) 
0.653 
(0.646) 
-0.221*** 
(0.036) 
-1.065*** 
(0.159) 
 
1.815*** 
(0.234) 
0.576*** 
(0.056) 
 
 
 
-0.241*** 
(0.047) 
-1.139*** 
(0.165) 
 
1.837*** 
(0.294) 
0.698*** 
(0.085) 
 
-0.690 
(0.489) 
-0.254*** 
(0.047) 
-0.527*** 
(0.164) 
 
2.342*** 
(0.240) 
 
 
 
0.804*** 
(0.279) 
 
 
 
-0.0312 
(0.051) 
-0.939*** 
(0.233) 
 
0.806° 
(0.537) 
 
 
 
-0.507 
(0.746) 
 
-1.128*** 
(0.485) 
2.127*** 
(0.605) 
-0.072* 
(0.042) 
-0.742*** 
(0.159) 
 
2.211*** 
(0.219) 
0.399*** 
(0.052) 
-0.071 
(0.049) 
-0.732*** 
(0.191) 
 
2.285*** 
(0.240) 
0.296*** 
(0.069) 
 
0.689 
(0.424) 
 
0.017 
(0.077) 
-1.061 
(0.315) 
 
2.572*** 
(0.408) 
 
 
 
1.719*** 
(0.571) 
-0.177 
(0.055)*** 
-1.054 
(0.212)*** 
 
2.169*** 
(0.713) 
 
 
 
-0.034 
(0.999) 
 
0.254 
(0.516) 
2.082*** 
(0.709) 
Log-lik 
Restr. L. L. 
n. observ.s 
-258.107 
-310.494 
180 
-268,752 
-345.832 
225 
-266.133 
-345.780 
225 
-275.369 
-352.845 
225 
-1.128 
2.127 
225 
-520.530 
-664.117 
450’ 
-517.959 
-662.552 
450 
-523.135 
-673.769 
450 
-518.361 
-666.654 
450 
Notes: estimates in columns (2)-(5) are related to the 6
th- 10
th periods; estimates in columns (6)-(9) are related to the 6
th- 10
th periods. Legend: Neighbors’ 
action: average number of tokens sent by the neighbors. Own type: average index for generosity and risk aversion at individual level (generosity and risk 
aversion are dummy variables equal to 1 when the individuals are, respectively, more generous and less risk averse, 0 otherwise). Neighbors’ type:  average 
index for generosity and risk aversion at neighborhood’s level. Trusting: dummy equal to 1 when both the variables “own type” and “neighbors’ type” are 
above  the mean value in the sample (so that less risk averse and more generous individuals are grouped with agents with similar characteristics). Untrusting: 
dummy equal to 1 when both the variables “own type” and “neighbors’ type” are below the mean value in the sample. ***statistically significant at 1% level; 
**statistically significant at 5% level; *statistically significant at 10% level; °statistically significant at 20% level. ^lower and upper limits: 0,6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIGURES 
 
FIG. 1: Number of tokens sent in the fifth period by each trustor as a function of neighbors’ choices 
 in the previous period. 
 
 
FIG. 2: Average number of tokens sent by each trustor as a function of  
neighbors’ choices in the previous period   (6
th – 20
th periods). 
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FIG.  14: NEIGHBORHOOD 12
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FIG.  13: NEIGHBORHOOD 11
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FIG.  11: NEIGHBORHOOD 9 
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FIG.  17: NEIGHBORHOOD 15
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